

Incorporating Fault Tolerance in Analog-to-Digital Converters (ADCs)

Mandeep Singh[†] and Israel Koren

[†] *Advanced Micro Devices, Austin, TX 78741*
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003

Abstract

The reliability of ADCs used in highly critical systems can be increased by applying a two-step procedure starting with sensitivity analysis followed by redesign. The sensitivity analysis is used to identify the most sensitive blocks which could then be redesigned for better reliability by incorporating fault tolerance. This paper illustrates the steps involved in incorporating fault tolerance in an ADC. Two redesign techniques to improve the reliability of a circuit are presented. Novel selective node resizing algorithms for increased tolerance against α -particle induced transients are discussed.

1. Introduction

Critical systems used in space, avionics and biomedical applications have to be highly reliable since the effect of a fault in these systems can be catastrophic. The reliability of these systems can be increased by redesigning them for improved fault tolerance. The system under redesign should undergo a fault sensitivity analysis before and after redesign to gauge the improvement in the reliability of the system. Fault sensitivity analysis involves injection of faults either in the actual hardware or in software through simulation. The latter method is preferable since the former requires a prototype which is expensive. The latter also enables an analysis early in the design process thus eliminating costly redesign.

The reliability of a system is determined by the fault tolerance of its constituent blocks. Systems in space, biomedical and avionics applications consist of an analog front-end to collect data for control and observation purposes and a digital unit which processes the collected data. Digital circuits have been studied extensively for their sensitivity to transient faults [1, 2] and many techniques have been suggested to improve their fault tolerance [2]. In contrast, very little has been done to address the issue of fault tolerance in analog circuits and ADCs which are integral parts of most mixed-signal circuits. Hence, it is necessary to explore techniques to increase the fault tolerance of ADCs. The process of increasing the tolerance of a circuit to transient faults can be divided into two steps:

- (i) Grading blocks of the circuit based on their sensitivities to transients and identifying *critical blocks*.
- (ii) Increasing the fault tolerance of the identified *critical blocks*.

Such a process can yield the most cost-effective way to incorporate fault tolerance into the design. This work addresses both of these steps by first proposing a methodology to analyze the sensitivity of an ADC and then by suggesting techniques to increase the reliability of the ADC. The fault injection experiments, for gauging the sensitivity of the designs addressed in this work, were performed for α -particle induced transients. This is because 85% or more computer system failures are known to be caused by transient faults [3] and among the energetic nuclear particles that can cause a transient fault, α -particles have been identified to be the most damaging [4]. However, the techniques developed for these faults can be extended to transient faults caused by other sources. Though α -particles are mainly found in space, trace amounts of α -particles are also found in ICs on the ground due to decay of radioactive elements present in the packaging material or solder [4]. Extraterrestrial cosmic rays which bombard earth continuously are another source of α -particle radiation. Thus the applicability of this work is not restricted to systems in outer space but also to other ground based critical systems.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a functional description of the ADCs addressed in this work. In Section 3, the fault sensitivity analysis methodology is discussed. The results of fault sensitivity analysis of the Δ - Σ and successive approximation (SA) ADCs are presented in Section 4. Section 5 illustrates the reliability improvements achieved by incorporating redesign techniques like opting for more robust implementations and selective node resizing. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the findings of the work.

2. Analog to Digital Converters

Analog to Digital Converters are integral parts of data acquisition systems and act as an interface between analog blocks that acquire the data and digital

blocks that process the data. In this work two representative high accuracy architectures, namely, *successive approximation* and Δ - Σ ADC are analyzed.

2.1. Successive Approximation

Figure 1 shows the block diagram of a typical charge redistribution implementation of the *successive approximation* architecture. This implementation progresses like a binary search algorithm to arrive at the final digital output with an error of no more than $0.5 V_{LSB}$. The objective during this conversion is to drive the difference between the DAC (convertlatch) output and the sampled input to zero. One bit is converted in each cycle starting with the most significant bit. Hence, it takes N cycles in all to produce an N-bit digital output. A precise capacitor matching is required for this conversion. Current fabrication technologies cater to this requirement quite effectively.




Figure 1: **Successive Approximation architecture**

2.2. Δ - Σ




Figure 2: **Δ - Σ converter**

Figure 2 shows the block diagram of a Δ - Σ ADC. The Δ - Σ modulator is an analog component and the decimation filter is a digital component. The most common implementation of the Δ - Σ modulator provides an oversampled serial output which is a digital representation of the input signal. This serial output thus

obtained has high frequency noise in addition to the signal information. The digital decimation filter stage (see Figure 2), following the modulator, filters out this noise and provides a high resolution output.

3. Fault Sensitivity Analysis Methodology

Fault sensitivity analysis enables the designer to identify *critical blocks* which can be redesigned for improving the reliability of the system. Our recent work [5, 6] has shown that the fault sensitivity analysis for an α -particle induced transient can be performed at an early stage in the design cycle of mixed-signal circuits.

Two metrics namely, the Probability Of Failure (*POF*) [5] and the Average Relative Error (*ARE*) [6] have been proposed in our previous work. To calculate the *POF* for a circuit with n nodes we first inject a current representing an α -particle hit into each node (this is simulated in Hspice) and observe the output. The outcome of such an experiment is denoted by E_i

$$E_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if the injection into node } i \text{ results in} \\ & \text{a failure} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Since the effect of an α -particle hit depends on the level of injected current, the input voltage and the time of injection we calculate \bar{E}_i

$$\bar{E}_i = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^k E_i, \quad k = p \cdot q \cdot r \quad (2)$$

where p is the number of input values for which the simulation was performed, q is the number of injection levels considered and r is the number of time instances at which faults were injected. We then assign each node i a weight, denoted by w_i , which is proportional to the size of its sensitive (to faults) area. This reflects the fact that larger area nodes are more likely to be hit by an α -particle. The sensitive area does not include the area of the interconnects since a particle hit in this area will not cause a fault [5]. Thus, the *POF* metric is defined as

$$POF = \sum_{i=1}^n w_i \bar{E}_i, \quad w_i = \frac{A_{s,i}}{\sum_{i=1}^n A_{s,i}} \quad (3)$$

where $A_{s,i}$ is the area of the fault-sensitive portion of node i . Whereas the *POF* gives an idea about the frequency of errors, the *ARE* assigns more weightage to the magnitude of errors. The *ARE* is given by

$$ARE = \sum_{i=1}^n w_i \bar{E}_{rel,i}, \quad \bar{E}_{rel,i} = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^k E_{rel,i} \quad (4)$$

where w_i is calculated using (3) and $E_{rel,i}$, the relative error due to an injection at node i is given by

$$E_{rel,i} = \Delta V / V_{exp}, \quad \Delta V = |V_{err} - V_{exp}| \quad (5)$$

where V_{exp} is the expected correct output and V_{err} is the erroneous output.

The choice of a metric for sensitivity analysis should be based on the design objective. A design objective of lowering the frequency of errors would call for the usage of *POF* for sensitivity analysis. In contrast, if reducing the magnitude of error is the design objective, *ARE* should be used. Following are the steps involved in the fault sensitivity analysis of an ADC: (i) Calculate *weights* of the nodes (w_i) (ii) Perform transient fault simulations on all nodes (iii) Based on the design objectives, use equation (3) or (4) to calculate the sensitivity of the constituent blocks.

4. ADC Sensitivity Analysis

Transient fault injection experiments were performed on 4-bit transistor level implementations of *successive approximation* and the Δ - Σ ADC. The results obtained from the simulations have been used to grade the fault sensitivities of the blocks in the ADC. Since the choice of a metric (*POF* or *ARE*) for sensitivity analysis is not dependent on the ADC architecture, any metric could have been used. In this work, *POF* has been used as the sensitivity measure for the SA ADC and *ARE* has been used for the Δ - Σ ADC.

4.1. Successive Approximation




Figure 3: **Block sensitivity variation with inputs (SA), $q=14$, $r=32$**

Sensitivity analysis results for the 4-bit implementation of the SA ADC in our earlier work [5] identified the *convertlatch* and the *outputlatch* (Figure 1) as the *critical blocks* (see Figure 3). Further analysis performed on the *convertlatch* revealed that out of the four latches in *convertlatch*, the latch containing the most significant bit is the most sensitive (Figure 4). This is because the MSB is used for generating the rest of the bits of the ADC. Therefore, an injection at the MSB has a higher probability of turning into an error.




Figure 4: **Sensitivity of the four latches in convertlatch (SA), $p=3$, $q=14$, $r=32$**

4.2. Δ - Σ ADC

Like the SA ADC, the Δ - Σ ADC takes several cycles to generate the final ADC output. The number of cycles required to generate the final output is governed by the oversampling ratio of the Δ - Σ converter. For the 4-bit Δ - Σ ADC implemented for this work the Δ - Σ modulator generates eight bits in eight clock cycles. These eight bits are then digitally filtered and the final 4-bit ADC output is generated at a decimated frequency.

A sensitivity analysis of the Δ - Σ ADC reveals that the digital decimation filter is the most *critical block* (see Table 1).

Block	Input (V)		ARE
	2	3	
Δ - Σ Modulator	0.00002	0.00006	0.00004
Decimation Filter	0.00426	0.00573	0.005

Table 1: **Δ - Σ ADC sensitivity analysis, $p=2$, $q=8$, $r=16$**

5. Redesign Techniques

A sensitivity analysis identifies *critical blocks* that the designer can concentrate on to improve the reliability of the system. Fault tolerance of a block can be improved in one of two ways: (1) Evaluating the sensitivities of alternative implementations of a block and selecting the most robust implementation. (2) Affecting design changes in the existing implementation.

It is essential to gauge the improvement that each of these techniques offers as this would help the designer to decide on the most cost-effective fault tolerance design strategy. The following sections describe two such techniques and also illustrate the amount of sensitivity improvement that can be gained by employing them. In

[6] the technique of opting for alternative robust implementations has been used for the Flash and Folding and Interpolating ADC. A different approach is required for incorporating fault tolerance in the two ADCs analyzed here.

5.1. Successive Approximation




Figure 5: **Transient Pulse Tolerant Latch (TPTL)**

The sensitivity analysis of the 4-bit SA ADC had identified the convertlatch and the outputlatch as the most *critical blocks* (Section 4.1). The Transient Pulse Tolerant Latch (TPTL) proposed in [7] was considered for sensitivity reduction (see Figure 5). The resistors (R) added in TPTL filter out the transients arriving at the input of the latch thus hardening it against transients. With increasing values of the resistors the latch becomes more fault tolerant but at the same time a performance penalty has to be expected. Figures 6 and 7 show that the ARE reduces by 50% and the POF reduces by as much as 45% for a resistance value of 15K. These figures also show that the ARE may




Figure 6: **Variation in sensitivity with increasing resistance (R), $p=3, q=8, r=32$**

sometimes mask sensitivity improvements. Though the ARE (Figure 6) remains almost constant for an input




Figure 7: **Variation in sensitivity with increasing resistance (R), $p=3, q=8, r=32$**




Figure 8: **Variation in performance with increasing resistance (R), $p=3, q=8, r=32$**

value of 0.9v, the POF (Figure 7) reduces by as much as 50%. Therefore, the choice of a metric to gauge the sensitivity should be based on whether the candidate application requires a reduction in the frequency of errors or the magnitude of error. The improvement in sensitivity is achieved at a cost of performance. Figure 8 shows that the delay of a latch increases with an increasing resistance in a superlinear fashion. Therefore, the final resistance value should be chosen by taking the performance degradation into account. In our experiments, a resistance of 10K seems to provide a good compromise between sensitivity improvement and performance degradation. The overhead can be further reduced by replacing only the most sensitive latch in convertlatch by TPTL. Figure 4 shows that the latch holding the MSB is the most sensitive. Sensitivity analysis performed after replacing only the MSB latch in convertlatch by TPTL (instead of all the latches in this block) revealed that almost identical improvements in ARE is obtained (see Figure 6). However, the improvement in POF is not comparable (see Figure 7). This further fortifies the argument of the selection of a metric (POF or ARE) being design objective dependent.

5.2. Δ - Σ ADC

Our earlier work [6] presented an implementation of the Δ - Σ modulator with redundancy which achieved sensitivity gains of 65.8% with a 75% overall area overhead. Two techniques for reliability enhancement with a lesser overall area overhead are presented here. The first technique uses TPTL as a more robust alternative to the latch. The second technique uses transistor sizing which can lead to substantial reliability improvements [6]. This improvement however, is achieved at the cost of considerable area overhead. An alternative strategy is proposed where nodes are selectively resized thus reducing the area overhead. Two algorithms for resizing selective nodes for reliability improvement have been experimented with. These algorithms were applied to a 2-bit counter (with 73 circuit nodes) used in the digital decimation filter in the Δ - Σ ADC and the variation of the sensitivity with sizing and by bounding the maximum injection level was analyzed.

A. Alternative Robust Implementation

Since the digital decimation filter in the Δ - Σ ADC uses latches extensively, using the TPTL described in the previous section can lower the sensitivity of the decimation filter. Simulations were performed by replacing all latches with TPTL and the sensitivity of the Non-Fault Tolerant (NFT) and the Fault Tolerant (FT) versions were compared. A resistance of 10K was used in TPTL as the simulations performed for the SA ADC revealed that this value was the most cost-effective. Improvement in sensitivities of as much as 21% (Table 2) was observed. This improvement is achieved at a cost of performance (see Figure 8).

Input(V)	NFT (ARE)	FT (ARE)	% imp
2	0.00428	0.00341	20.3
3	0.00579	0.00497	14
Avg.	0.00504	0.00398	21

Table 2: Δ - Σ ADC (NFT Vs FT) sensitivity, $p=2$, $q=8$, $r=16$

B. Selective node resizing

Nodes which will result in maximum sensitivity gains should be chosen as candidates for sizing. One of the schemes that can be followed sorts the nodes in decreasing order of their contribution to the overall sensitivity of the block. Out of this sorted list the first n nodes can be selected as candidates for resizing. For our experiments the twelve most sensitive nodes ($n=12$) in the counter were considered for re-




Figure 9: Sensitivity variation with selective node resizing with injection level bounded by 1pC (the number on the curves indicate the corresponding fault-sensitive area increase factor)

sizing. Figures 9 and 10 show that for lower injection level bounds (1pC) the *most-sensitive-node-first* algorithm shows sensitivity improvement of as much as 60% with an area overhead of only 20%. The numbers on the curves indicate the area increase factor corresponding to the sizing factor which results in the lowest sensitivity among the sizing factors considered (sizing factor of 4 in Figure 9 and 6 in Figures 10,11,12). The above




Figure 10: Sensitivity variation with selective node resizing (bounded by 2pC)

node selection scheme works well for injection levels bounded by 1pC. However, the improvement is not so sizeable for higher injection level bounds (see Figure 10). This motivates a search for a better node selection scheme and an insight into why the improvement is not so sizeable for higher injection levels. The error offset at a node caused by an injection is dependent among other factors on the injection level and the transistor driving strength. Denote by ΔV the erroneous voltage offset $\Delta V = I_{inj}R_{on}$, where I_{inj} is the magnitude of the injected current and R_{on} is the resistance posed by

the transistor connected to the node. ΔV can be reduced by lowering R_{on} , which can be achieved by sizing up the transistor. But if R_{on} is large then the transis-




Figure 11: **Sensitivity variation with selective node resizing, $n=12$ (bounded by $1pC$)**

tor will have to be considerably sized before any gain in sensitivity can be seen. It is very likely that these kind of nodes will show up at the top of the sorted list of nodes. Thus, in such cases it is possible to achieve considerable sensitivity gains with a small area overhead by opting for an alternate scheme. In this scheme




Figure 12: **Sensitivity variation with selective node resizing, $n=12$ (bounded by $2pC$)**

only the m nodes at the bottom of the sorted list of the n most sensitive nodes are sized. Note that since the m nodes are selected from a list of n most sensitive nodes they are still quite sensitive. Figures 11 and 12 show that for higher injection bounds sizeable improvement in sensitivity, with a smaller area overhead (5% in Figure 12 Vs 64% in Figure 10 for 8 nodes), can be attained by opting for the alternate scheme (the “bottom four” and “bottom eight” curves in Figure 12 show the sensitivity variation when m is 4 and 8, respectively).

Therefore, for lower injection levels ($\leq 1pC$) resizing the n most sensitive nodes will prove beneficial and for

higher injection levels ($\geq 2pC$) resizing the least sensitive m nodes in the sorted list of n will prove more cost-effective. The selective node selection strategy provides sensitivity gains with minimum area overhead among the two strategies considered. This is an example of a strategy for effective node selection for reliability enhancement.

6. Conclusions

The steps involved in incorporating fault tolerance in ADCs were illustrated. *Critical blocks* in the Δ - Σ and SA ADC were identified and the benefits of re-design techniques like opting for more robust implementations and selective node resizing have been analyzed. Sensitivity gains of as much as 50% for the SA ADC and 21% for the Δ - Σ ADC were observed. It was also observed that selective node resizing provides sensitivity gains of as much as 60% for the 2-bit counter used in the Δ - Σ ADC. This improvement is achieved at a considerably less area overhead compared to the full circuit sizing solution.

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7. References

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